美国是世界上公司法、证券法研究最为发达的国家之一，在美国法学期刊（Law Review & Journals）上每年发表400多篇以公司法和证券法为主题的论文。自1994年开始，美国的公司法学者每年会投票从中遴选出10篇左右重要的论文，重印于Corporate Practice Commentator，至2008年，已经评选了15年，计177篇论文入选。
以下是每年入选的论文列表：
1999年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：
1.Bankman, Joseph and Ronald J. Gilson. Why Start-ups? 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289-308 (1999).
2.Bhagat, Sanjai and Bernard Black. The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance. 54 Bus. Law. 921-963 (1999).
3.Blair, Margaret M. and Lynn A. Stout. A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. 85 Va. L. Rev. 247-328 (1999).
4.Coates, John C., IV. “Fair Value” As an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions. 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251-1359 (1999).
5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications. 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641-707 (1999).
6.Eisenberg, Melvin A. Corporate Law and Social Norms. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253-1292 (1999).
7.Hamermesh, Lawrence A. Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 Tul. L. Rev. 409-495 (1998).
8.Krawiec, Kimberly D. Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later. 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1039-1104.
9.Langevoort, Donald C. Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319-1343 (1999).
10.Langevoort, Donald C. Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others. 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87-125 (1999).
11.Talley, Eric. Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine. 108 Yale L.J. 277-375 (1998).
12.Williams, Cynthia A. The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency. 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197-1311 (1999).
1998年：
1.Carney, William J., The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715-780 (1998).
2.Choi, Stephen, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916-966 (1998).
3.Coffee, John C., Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation. 52 Bus. Law. 1195-1233 (1997).
4.Langevoort, Donald C., Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms). 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101-172 (1997).
5.Langevoort, Donald C., The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior. 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629-676 (1997).
6.Mann, Ronald J. The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending. 86 Geo. L.J. 1-44 (1997).
7.Milhaupt, Curtis J., Property Rights in Firms. 84 Va. L. Rev. 1145-1194 (1998).
8.Rock, Edward B., Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009-1107 (1997).
9.Romano, Roberta, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation. 107 Yale L.J. 2359-2430 (1998).
10.Schwab, Stewart J. and Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions. 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018-1094 (1998).
11.Skeel, David A., Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy. 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325-1398 (1998).
12.Thomas, Randall S. and Martin, Kenneth J., Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals? 73 Wash. L. Rev. 41-80 (1998).
1997年：
1.Alexander, Janet Cooper, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487-1537 (1996).
2.Arlen, Jennifer and Kraakman, Reinier, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687-779 (1997).
3.Brudney, Victor, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595-665 (1997).
4.Carney, William J., The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Legal Stud. 303-329 (1997).
5.Choi, Stephen J., Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567-651 (1997).
6.Fox, Merritt B., Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom. 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498-2632 (1997).
7.Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1539-1571 (1996).
8.Mahoney, Paul G., The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453-1500 (1997).
9.Milhaupt, Curtis J., The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 865-898 (1997).
10.Skeel, David A., Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127-175 (1997).
1996年：
1.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996)
2.Gilson, Ronald J. Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 327 (1996)
3. Hu, Henry T.C. Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 21 J. Corp. L. 3 (1995)
4.Kahan, Marcel & Michael Klausner Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)
5.Kitch, Edmund W. The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 763 (1995)
6.Langevoort, Donald C. Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 627 (1996)
7.Lin, Laura The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 898 (1996)
8.Millstein, Ira M. The Professional Board, 50 Bus. Law 1427 (1995)
9.Thompson, Robert B. Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo. L.J. 1 (1995)
10.Triantis, George G. and Daniels, Ronald J. The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance. 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1073 (1995)
1995年：
公司法：
1.Arlen, Jennifer and Deborah M. Weiss A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,. 105 Yale L.J. 325-391 (1995).
2.Elson, Charles M. The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995).
3.Hu, Henry T.C. Heeding Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 985-1040 (1995).
4.Kahan, Marcel The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 565-622 (1995).
5.Klausner, Michael Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757-852 (1995).
6.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477-537 (1995).
7.Siegel, Mary Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 Harv. J. on Legis. 79-143 (1995).
证券法：
1.Grundfest, Joseph A. Why Disimply? 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727-747 (1995).
2.Lev, Baruch and Meiring de Villiers Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7-37 (1994).
3.Mahoney, Paul G. Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047-1112 (1995).
4.Seligman, Joel The Merits Do Matter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438 (1994).
5.Seligman, Joel The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 649-702 (1995).
6.Stout, Lynn A. Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Mark Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995).
7.Weiss, Elliott J. and John S. Beckerman Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053-2127 (1995).
1994年：
公司法：
1.Fraidin, Stephen and Hanson, Jon D. Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Yale L.J. 1739-1834 (1994)
2.Gordon, Jeffrey N. Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124-192 (1994)
3.Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Lott, John R., Jr. The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & Econ. 757-802 (1993)
4.Kraakman, Reiner, Park, Hyun, and Shavell, Steven When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo. L.J. 1733-1775 (1994)
5.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425- 491 (1993)
6.Oesterle, Dale A. and Palmiter, Alan R. Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485-583 (1994)
7. Pound, John The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003-1071 (1993)
8.Skeel, David A., Jr. Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471-557 (1994)
9.Thompson, Robert B. Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1-41 (1994)
证券法：
1.Alexander, Janet Cooper The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 1421-1469 (1994)
2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1-40 (1993)
3.Black, Bernard S. and Coffee, John C. Jr. Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997-2087 (1994)
4.Booth, Richard A. The Efficient Market, portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1187-1212 (1993)
5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 Cardozo L. Rev 837-907 (1994)
6.Fox, Merritt B. Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2088-2203 (1994)
7.Grundfest, Joseph A. Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961-1024 (1994)
8.Macey, Jonathan R. Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 909-949 (1994)
9.Rock, Edward B. Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 987-1031 (1994)
以下是每年入选的论文列表：
1999年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：
1.Bankman, Joseph and Ronald J. Gilson. Why Start-ups? 51 Stan. L. Rev. 289-308 (1999).
2.Bhagat, Sanjai and Bernard Black. The Uncertain Relationship Between Board Composition and Firm Performance. 54 Bus. Law. 921-963 (1999).
3.Blair, Margaret M. and Lynn A. Stout. A Team Production Theory of Corporate Law. 85 Va. L. Rev. 247-328 (1999).
4.Coates, John C., IV. “Fair Value” As an Avoidable Rule of Corporate Law: Minority Discounts in Conflict Transactions. 147 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1251-1359 (1999).
5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The Future as History: The Prospects for Global Convergence in Corporate Governance and Its Implications. 93 Nw. U. L. Rev. 641-707 (1999).
6.Eisenberg, Melvin A. Corporate Law and Social Norms. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1253-1292 (1999).
7.Hamermesh, Lawrence A. Corporate Democracy and Stockholder-Adopted By-laws: Taking Back the Street? 73 Tul. L. Rev. 409-495 (1998).
8.Krawiec, Kimberly D. Derivatives, Corporate Hedging, and Shareholder Wealth: Modigliani-Miller Forty Years Later. 1998 U. Ill. L. Rev. 1039-1104.
9.Langevoort, Donald C. Rereading Cady, Roberts: The Ideology and Practice of Insider Trading Regulation. 99 Colum. L. Rev. 1319-1343 (1999).
10.Langevoort, Donald C. Half-Truths: Protecting Mistaken Inferences By Investors and Others. 52 Stan. L. Rev. 87-125 (1999).
11.Talley, Eric. Turning Servile Opportunities to Gold: A Strategic Analysis of the Corporate Opportunities Doctrine. 108 Yale L.J. 277-375 (1998).
12.Williams, Cynthia A. The Securities and Exchange Commission and Corporate Social Transparency. 112 Harv. L. Rev. 1197-1311 (1999).
1998年：
1.Carney, William J., The Production of Corporate Law, 71 S. Cal. L. Rev. 715-780 (1998).
2.Choi, Stephen, Market Lessons for Gatekeepers, 92 Nw. U. L. Rev. 916-966 (1998).
3.Coffee, John C., Jr., Brave New World?: The Impact(s) of the Internet on Modern Securities Regulation. 52 Bus. Law. 1195-1233 (1997).
4.Langevoort, Donald C., Organized Illusions: A Behavioral Theory of Why Corporations Mislead Stock Market Investors (and Cause Other Social Harms). 146 U. Pa. L. Rev. 101-172 (1997).
5.Langevoort, Donald C., The Epistemology of Corporate-Securities Lawyering: Beliefs, Biases and Organizational Behavior. 63 Brook. L. Rev. 629-676 (1997).
6.Mann, Ronald J. The Role of Secured Credit in Small-Business Lending. 86 Geo. L.J. 1-44 (1997).
7.Milhaupt, Curtis J., Property Rights in Firms. 84 Va. L. Rev. 1145-1194 (1998).
8.Rock, Edward B., Saints and Sinners: How Does Delaware Corporate Law Work? 44 UCLA L. Rev. 1009-1107 (1997).
9.Romano, Roberta, Empowering Investors: A Market Approach to Securities Regulation. 107 Yale L.J. 2359-2430 (1998).
10.Schwab, Stewart J. and Randall S. Thomas, Realigning Corporate Governance: Shareholder Activism by Labor Unions. 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1018-1094 (1998).
11.Skeel, David A., Jr., An Evolutionary Theory of Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy. 51 Vand. L. Rev. 1325-1398 (1998).
12.Thomas, Randall S. and Martin, Kenneth J., Should Labor Be Allowed to Make Shareholder Proposals? 73 Wash. L. Rev. 41-80 (1998).
1997年：
1.Alexander, Janet Cooper, Rethinking Damages in Securities Class Actions, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1487-1537 (1996).
2.Arlen, Jennifer and Kraakman, Reinier, Controlling Corporate Misconduct: An Analysis of Corporate Liability Regimes, 72 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 687-779 (1997).
3.Brudney, Victor, Contract and Fiduciary Duty in Corporate Law, 38 B.C. L. Rev. 595-665 (1997).
4.Carney, William J., The Political Economy of Competition for Corporate Charters, 26 J. Legal Stud. 303-329 (1997).
5.Choi, Stephen J., Company Registration: Toward a Status-Based Antifraud Regime, 64 U. Chi. L. Rev. 567-651 (1997).
6.Fox, Merritt B., Securities Disclosure in a Globalizing Market: Who Should Regulate Whom. 95 Mich. L. Rev. 2498-2632 (1997).
7.Kahan, Marcel and Klausner, Michael, Lockups and the Market for Corporate Control, 48 Stan. L. Rev. 1539-1571 (1996).
8.Mahoney, Paul G., The Exchange as Regulator, 83 Va. L. Rev. 1453-1500 (1997).
9.Milhaupt, Curtis J., The Market for Innovation in the United States and Japan: Venture Capital and the Comparative Corporate Governance Debate, 91 Nw. U.L. Rev. 865-898 (1997).
10.Skeel, David A., Jr., The Unanimity Norm in Delaware Corporate Law, 83 Va. L. Rev. 127-175 (1997).
1996年：
1.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman A Self-Enforcing Model of Corporate Law, 109 Harv. L. Rev. 1911 (1996)
2.Gilson, Ronald J. Corporate Governance and Economic Efficiency: When Do Institutions Matter?, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 327 (1996)
3. Hu, Henry T.C. Hedging Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 21 J. Corp. L. 3 (1995)
4.Kahan, Marcel & Michael Klausner Path Dependence in Corporate Contracting: Increasing Returns, Herd Behavior and Cognitive Biases, 74 Wash. U. L.Q. 347 (1996)
5.Kitch, Edmund W. The Theory and Practice of Securities Disclosure, 61 Brooklyn L. Rev. 763 (1995)
6.Langevoort, Donald C. Selling Hope, Selling Risk: Some Lessons for Law From Behavioral Economics About Stockbrokers and Sophisticated Customers, 84 Cal. L. Rev. 627 (1996)
7.Lin, Laura The Effectiveness of Outside Directors as a Corporate Governance Mechanism: Theories and Evidence, 90 Nw. U.L. Rev. 898 (1996)
8.Millstein, Ira M. The Professional Board, 50 Bus. Law 1427 (1995)
9.Thompson, Robert B. Exit, Liquidity, and Majority Rule: Appraisal's Role in Corporate Law, 84 Geo. L.J. 1 (1995)
10.Triantis, George G. and Daniels, Ronald J. The Role of Debt in Interactive Corporate Governance. 83 Cal. L. Rev. 1073 (1995)
1995年：
公司法：
1.Arlen, Jennifer and Deborah M. Weiss A Political Theory of Corporate Taxation,. 105 Yale L.J. 325-391 (1995).
2.Elson, Charles M. The Duty of Care, Compensation, and Stock Ownership, 63 U. Cin. L. Rev. 649 (1995).
3.Hu, Henry T.C. Heeding Expectations: "Derivative Reality" and the Law and Finance of the Corporate Objective, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 985-1040 (1995).
4.Kahan, Marcel The Qualified Case Against Mandatory Terms in Bonds, 89 Nw. U.L. Rev. 565-622 (1995).
5.Klausner, Michael Corporations, Corporate Law, and Networks of Contracts, 81 Va. L. Rev. 757-852 (1995).
6.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Cooperation and Constraint in the Modern Corporation: An Inquiry Into the Causes of Corporate Immorality, 73 Tex. L. Rev. 477-537 (1995).
7.Siegel, Mary Back to the Future: Appraisal Rights in the Twenty-First Century, 32 Harv. J. on Legis. 79-143 (1995).
证券法：
1.Grundfest, Joseph A. Why Disimply? 108 Harv. L. Rev. 727-747 (1995).
2.Lev, Baruch and Meiring de Villiers Stock Price Crashes and 10b-5 Damages: A Legal Economic, and Policy Analysis, 47 Stan. L. Rev. 7-37 (1994).
3.Mahoney, Paul G. Mandatory Disclosure as a Solution to Agency Problems, 62 U. Chi. L. Rev. 1047-1112 (1995).
4.Seligman, Joel The Merits Do Matter, 108 Harv. L. Rev. 438 (1994).
5.Seligman, Joel The Obsolescence of Wall Street: A Contextual Approach to the Evolving Structure of Federal Securities Regulation, 93 Mich. L. Rev. 649-702 (1995).
6.Stout, Lynn A. Are Stock Markets Costly Casinos? Disagreement, Mark Failure, and Securities Regulation, 81 Va. L. Rev. 611 (1995).
7.Weiss, Elliott J. and John S. Beckerman Let the Money Do the Monitoring: How Institutional Investors Can Reduce Agency Costs in Securities Class Actions, 104 Yale L.J. 2053-2127 (1995).
1994年：
公司法：
1.Fraidin, Stephen and Hanson, Jon D. Toward Unlocking Lockups, 103 Yale L.J. 1739-1834 (1994)
2.Gordon, Jeffrey N. Institutions as Relational Investors: A New Look at Cumulative Voting, 94 Colum. L. Rev. 124-192 (1994)
3.Karpoff, Jonathan M., and Lott, John R., Jr. The Reputational Penalty Firms Bear From Committing Criminal Fraud, 36 J.L. & Econ. 757-802 (1993)
4.Kraakman, Reiner, Park, Hyun, and Shavell, Steven When Are Shareholder Suits in Shareholder Interests?, 82 Geo. L.J. 1733-1775 (1994)
5.Mitchell, Lawrence E. Fairness and Trust in Corporate Law, 43 Duke L.J. 425- 491 (1993)
6.Oesterle, Dale A. and Palmiter, Alan R. Judicial Schizophrenia in Shareholder Voting Cases, 79 Iowa L. Rev. 485-583 (1994)
7. Pound, John The Rise of the Political Model of Corporate Governance and Corporate Control, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1003-1071 (1993)
8.Skeel, David A., Jr. Rethinking the Line Between Corporate Law and Corporate Bankruptcy, 72 Tex. L. Rev. 471-557 (1994)
9.Thompson, Robert B. Unpacking Limited Liability: Direct and Vicarious Liability of Corporate Participants for Torts of the Enterprise, 47 Vand. L. Rev. 1-41 (1994)
证券法：
1.Alexander, Janet Cooper The Value of Bad News in Securities Class Actions, 41 UCLA L.Rev. 1421-1469 (1994)
2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Insider Trading Under the Restatement of the Law Governing Lawyers, 19 J. Corp. L. 1-40 (1993)
3.Black, Bernard S. and Coffee, John C. Jr. Hail Britannia?: Institutional Investor Behavior Under Limited Regulation, 92 Mich. L. Rev. 1997-2087 (1994)
4.Booth, Richard A. The Efficient Market, portfolio Theory, and the Downward Sloping Demand Hypothesis, 68 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1187-1212 (1993)
5.Coffee, John C., Jr. The SEC and the Institutional Investor: A Half-Time Report, 15 Cardozo L. Rev 837-907 (1994)
6.Fox, Merritt B. Insider Trading Deterrence Versus Managerial Incentives: A Unified Theory of Section 16(b), 92 Mich. L. Rev. 2088-2203 (1994)
7.Grundfest, Joseph A. Disimplying Private Rights of Action Under the Federal Securities Laws: The Commission's Authority, 107 Harv. L. Rev. 961-1024 (1994)
8.Macey, Jonathan R. Administrative Agency Obsolescence and Interest Group Formation: A Case Study of the SEC at Sixty, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 909-949 (1994)
9.Rock, Edward B. Controlling the Dark Side of Relational Investing, 15 Cardozo L. Rev. 987-1031 (1994)