美国是世界上公司法、证券法研究最为发达的国家之一，在美国法学期刊（Law Review & Journals）上每年发表400多篇以公司法和证券法为主题的论文。自1994年开始，美国的公司法学者每年会投票从中遴选出10篇左右重要的论文，重印于Corporate Practice Commentator，至2008年，已经评选了15年，计177篇论文入选。
以下是每年入选的论文列表：
2008年（以第一作者姓名音序为序）：
1.Anabtawi, Iman and Lynn Stout. Fiduciary duties for activist shareholders. 60 Stan. L. Rev. 1255-1308 (2008).
2.Brummer, Chris. Corporate law preemption in an age of global capital markets. 81 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1067-1114 (2008).
3.Choi, Stephen and Marcel Kahan. The market penalty for mutual fund scandals. 87 B.U. L. Rev. 1021-1057 (2007).
4.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. On beyond CalPERS: Survey evidence on the developing role of public pension funds in corporate governance. 61 Vand. L. Rev. 315-354 (2008).
5.Cox, James D., Randall S. Thomas and Lynn Bai. There are plaintiffs and…there are plaintiffs: An empirical analysis of securities class action settlements. 61 Vand. L. Rev. 355-386 (2008).
6.Henderson, M. Todd. Paying CEOs in bankruptcy: Executive compensation when agency costs are low. 101 Nw. U. L. Rev. 1543-1618 (2007).
7.Hu, Henry T.C. and Bernard Black. Equity and debt decoupling and empty voting II: Importance and extensions. 156 U. Pa. L. Rev. 625-739 (2008).
8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. The hanging chads of corporate voting. 96 Geo. L.J. 1227-1281 (2008).
9.Strine, Leo E., Jr. Toward common sense and common ground? Reflections on the shared interests of managers and labor in a more rational system of corporate governance. 33 J. Corp. L. 1-20 (2007).
10.Subramanian, Guhan. Go-shops vs. no-shops in private equity deals: Evidence and implications. 63 Bus. Law. 729-760 (2008).
2007年：
1.Baker, Tom and Sean J. Griffith. The Missing Monitor in Corporate Governance: The Directors’ & Officers’ Liability Insurer. 95 Geo. L.J. 1795-1842 (2007).
2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. The Myth of the Shareholder Franchise. 93 Va. L. Rev. 675-732 (2007).
3.Choi, Stephen J. and Robert B. Thompson. Securities Litigation and Its Lawyers: Changes During the First Decade After the PSLRA. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1489-1533 (2006).
4.Coffee, John C., Jr. Reforming the Securities Class Action: An Essay on Deterrence and Its Implementation. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1534-1586 (2006).
5.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Does the Plaintiff Matter? An Empirical Analysis of Lead Plaintiffs in Securities Class Actions. 106 Colum. L. Rev. 1587-1640 (2006).
6.Eisenberg, Theodore and Geoffrey Miller. Ex Ante Choice of Law and Forum: An Empirical Analysis of Corporate Merger Agreements. 59 Vand. L. Rev. 1975-2013 (2006).
7.Gordon, Jeffrey N. The Rise of Independent Directors in the United States, 1950-2005: Of Shareholder Value and Stock Market Prices. 59 Stan. L. Rev. 1465-1568 (2007).
8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. Hedge Funds in Corporate Governance and Corporate Control. 155 U. Pa. L. Rev. 1021-1093 (2007).
9.Langevoort, Donald C. The Social Construction of Sarbanes-Oxley. 105 Mich. L. Rev. 1817-1855 (2007).
10.Roe, Mark J. Legal Origins, Politics, and Modern Stock Markets. 120 Harv. L. Rev. 460-527 (2006).
11.Subramanian, Guhan. Post-Siliconix Freeze-outs: Theory and Evidence. 36 J. Legal Stud. 1-26 (2007). (NOTE: This is an earlier working draft. The published article is not freely available, and at SLW we generally respect the intellectual property rights of others.)
2006年：
1.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director Primacy and Shareholder Disempowerment. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1735-1758 (2006).
2.Bebchuk, Lucian A. Letting Shareholders Set the Rules. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1784-1813 (2006).
3.Black, Bernard, Brian Cheffins and Michael Klausner. Outside Director Liability. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 1055-1159 (2006).
4.Choi, Stephen J., Jill E. Fisch and A.C. Pritchard. Do Institutions Matter? The Impact of the Lead Plaintiff Provision of the Private Securities Litigation Reform Act. 83
5.Cox, James D. and Randall S. Thomas. Letting Billions Slip Through Your Fingers: Empirical Evidence and Legal Implications of the Failure of Financial Institutions to Participate in Securities Class Action Settlements. 58 Stan. L. Rev. 411-454 (2005).
6.Gilson, Ronald J. Controlling Shareholders and Corporate Governance: Complicating the Comparative Taxonomy. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1641-1679 (2006).
7.Goshen , Zohar and Gideon Parchomovsky. The Essential Role of Securities Regulation. 55 Duke L.J. 711-782 (2006).
8.Hansmann, Henry, Reinier Kraakman and Richard Squire. Law and the Rise of the Firm. 119 Harv. L. Rev. 1333-1403 (2006).
9.Hu, Henry T. C. and Bernard Black. Empty Voting and Hidden (Morphable) Ownership: Taxonomy, Implications, and Reforms. 61 Bus. Law. 1011-1070 (2006).
10.Kahan, Marcel. The Demand for Corporate Law: Statutory Flexibility, Judicial Quality, or Takeover Protection? 22 J. L. Econ. & Org. 340-365 (2006).
11.Kahan, Marcel and Edward Rock. Symbiotic Federalism and the Structure of Corporate Law. 58 Vand. L. Rev. 1573-1622 (2005).
12.Smith, D. Gordon. The Exit Structure of Venture Capital. 53 UCLA L. Rev. 315-356 (2005).
2005年：
1.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye. The case for increasing shareholder power. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 833-914 (2005).
2.Bratton, William W. The new dividend puzzle. 93 Geo. L.J. 845-895 (2005).
3.Elhauge, Einer. Sacrificing corporate profits in the public interest. 80 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 733-869 (2005).
4.Johnson, . Corporate officers and the business judgment rule. 60 Bus. Law. 439-469 (2005).
5.Milhaupt, Curtis J. In the shadow of Delaware? The rise of hostile takeovers in Japan. 105 Colum. L. Rev. 2171-2216 (2005).
6.Ribstein, Larry E. Are partners fiduciaries? 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 209-251.
7.Roe, Mark J. Delaware?s politics. 118 Harv. L. Rev. 2491-2543 (2005).
8.Romano, Roberta. The Sarbanes-Oxley Act and the making of quack corporate governance. 114 Yale L.J. 1521-1611 (2005).
9.Subramanian, Guhan. Fixing freezeouts. 115 Yale L.J. 2-70 (2005).
10.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The public and private faces of derivative lawsuits. 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1747-1793 (2004).
11.Weiss, Elliott J. and J. White. File early, then free ride: How Delaware law (mis)shapes shareholder class actions. 57 Vand. L. Rev. 1797-1881 (2004).
2004年：
1Arlen, Jennifer and Eric Talley. Unregulable defenses and the perils of shareholder choice. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 577-666 (2003).
2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. The business judgment rule as abstention doctrine. 57 Vand. L. Rev. 83-130 (2004).
3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye and Alma Cohen. Firms' decisions where to incorporate. 46 J.L. & Econ. 383-425 (2003).
4.Blair, Margaret M. Locking in capital: what corporate law achieved for business organizers in the nineteenth century. 51 UCLA L. Rev. 387-455 (2003).
5.Gilson, Ronald J. and Jeffrey N. Gordon. Controlling shareholders. 152 U. Pa. L. Rev. 785-843 (2003).
6.Roe, Mark J. Delaware 's competition. 117 Harv. L. Rev. 588-646 (2003).
7.Sale, Hillary A. Delaware 's good faith. 89 Cornell L. Rev. 456-495 (2004).
8.Stout, Lynn A. The mechanisms of market inefficiency: an introduction to the new finance. 28 J. Corp. L. 635-669 (2003).
9.Subramanian, Guhan. Bargaining in the shadow of takeover defenses. 113 Yale L.J. 621-686 (2003).
10.Subramanian, Guhan. The disappearing Delaware effect. 20 J.L. Econ. & Org. 32-59 (2004)
11.Thompson, Robert B. and Randall S. Thomas. The new look of shareholder litigation: acquisition-oriented class actions. 57 Vand. L. Rev. 133-209 (2004).
2003年：
1.Ayres, Ian and Stephen Choi. Internalizing outsider trading. 101 Mich. L. Rev. 313-408 (2002).
2.Bainbridge, Stephen M. Director primacy: The means and ends of corporate governance. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 547-606 (2003).
3.Bebchuk, Lucian, Alma Cohen and Allen Ferrell. Does the evidence favor state competition in corporate law? 90 Cal. L. Rev. 1775-1821 (2002).
4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Further findings and a reply to symposium participants. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 885-917 (2002).
5.Choi, Stephen J. and Jill E. Fisch. How to fix Wall Street: A voucher financing proposal for securities intermediaries. 113 Yale L.J. 269-346 (2003).
6.Daines, Robert. The incorporation choices of IPO firms. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev.1559-1611 (2002).
7.Gilson, Ronald J. and David M. Schizer. Understanding venture capital structure: A tax explanation for convertible preferred stock. 116 Harv. L. Rev. 874-916 (2003).
8.Kahan, Marcel and Ehud Kamar. The myth of state competition in corporate law. 55 Stan. L. Rev. 679-749 (2002).
9.Langevoort, Donald C. Taming the animal spirits of the stock markets: A behavioral approach to securities regulation. 97 Nw. U. L. Rev. 135-188 (2002).
10.Pritchard, A.C. Justice Lewis F. Powell, Jr., and the counterrevolution in the federal securities laws. 52 Duke L.J. 841-949 (2003).
11.Thompson, Robert B. and Hillary A. Sale. Securities fraud as corporate governance: Reflections upon federalism. 56 Vand. L. Rev. 859-910 (2003).
2002年：
1.Allen, William T., Jack B. Jacobs and Leo E. Strine, Jr. Function over Form: A Reassessment of Standards of Review in Delaware Corporation Law. 26 Del. J. Corp. L. 859-895 (2001) and 56 Bus. Law. 1287 (2001).
2.Ayres, Ian and Joe Bankman. Substitutes for Insider Trading. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 235-254 (2001).
3.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, Jesse M. Fried and David I. Walker. Managerial Power and Rent Extraction in the Design of Executive Compensation. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 751-846 (2002).
4.Bebchuk, Lucian Arye, John C. Coates IV and Guhan Subramanian. The Powerful Antitakeover Force of Staggered Boards: Theory, Evidence, and Policy. 54 Stan. L. Rev. 887-951 (2002).
5.Black, Bernard and Reinier Kraakman. Delaware’s Takeover Law: The Uncertain Search for Hidden Value. 96 Nw. U. L. Rev. 521-566 (2002).
6.Bratton, William M. Enron and the Dark Side of Shareholder Value. 76 Tul. L. Rev. 1275-1361 (2002).
7.Coates, John C. IV. Explaining Variation in Takeover Defenses: Blame the Lawyers. 89 Cal. L. Rev. 1301-1421 (2001).
8.Kahan, Marcel and Edward B. Rock. How I Learned to Stop Worrying and Love the Pill: Adaptive Responses to Takeover Law. 69 U. Chi. L. Rev. 871-915 (2002).
9.Kahan, Marcel. Rethinking Corporate Bonds: The Trade-off Between Individual and Collective Rights. 77 N.Y.U. L. Rev. 1040-1089 (2002).
10.Roe, Mark J. Corporate Law’s Limits. 31 J. Legal Stud. 233-271 (2002).
11.Thompson, Robert B. and D. Gordon Smith. Toward a New Theory of the Shareholder Role: "Sacred Space" in Corporate Takeovers. 80 Tex. L. Rev. 261-326 (2001).
2001年：
1.Black, Bernard S. The legal and institutional preconditions for strong securities markets. 48 UCLA L. Rev. 781-855 (2001).
2.Coates, John C. IV. Takeover defenses in the shadow of the pill: a critique of the scientific evidence. 79 Tex. L. Rev. 271-382 (2000).
3.Coates, John C. IV and Guhan Subramanian. A buy-side model of M&A lockups: theory and evidence. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 307-396 (2000).
4.Coffee, John C., Jr. The rise of dispersed ownership: the roles of law and the state in the separation of ownership and control. 111 Yale L.J. 1-82 (2001).
5.Choi, Stephen J. The unfounded fear of Regulation S: empirical evidence on offshore securities offerings. 50 Duke L.J. 663-751 (2000).
6.Daines, Robert and Michael Klausner. Do IPO charters maximize firm value? Antitakeover protection in IPOs. 17 J.L. Econ. & Org. 83-120 (2001).
7.Hansmann, Henry and Reinier Kraakman. The essential role of organizational law. 110 Yale L.J. 387-440 (2000).
8.Langevoort, Donald C. The human nature of corporate boards: law, norms, and the unintended consequences of independence and accountability. 89 Geo. L.J. 797-832 (2001).
9.Mahoney, Paul G. The political economy of the Securities Act of 1933. 30 J. Legal Stud. 1-31 (2001).
10.Roe, Mark J. Political preconditions to separating ownership from corporate control. 53 Stan. L. Rev. 539-606 (2000).
11.Romano, Roberta. Less is more: making institutional investor activism a valuable mechanism of corporate governance. 18 Yale J. on Reg. 174-251 (2001).
2000年：
1.Bratton, William W. and Joseph A. McCahery. Comparative Corporate Governance and the Theory of the Firm: The Case Against Global Cross Reference. 38 Colum. J. Transnat’l L. 213-297 (1999).
2.Coates, John C. IV. Empirical Evidence on Structural Takeover Defenses: Where Do We Stand? 54 U. Miami L. Rev. 783-797 (2000).
3.Coffee, John C., Jr. Privatization and Corporate Governance: The Lessons from Securities Market Failure. 25 J. Corp. L. 1-39 (1999).
4.Fisch, Jill E. The Peculiar Role of the Delaware Courts in the Competition for Corporate Charters. 68 U. Cin. L. Rev. 1061-1100 (2000).
5.Fox, Merritt B. Retained Mandatory Securities Disclosure: Why Issuer Choice Is Not Investor Empowerment. 85 Va. L. Rev. 1335-1419 (1999).
6.Fried, Jesse M. Insider Signaling and Insider Trading with Repurchase Tender Offers. 67 U. Chi. L. Rev. 421-477 (2000).
7.Gulati, G. Mitu, William A. Klein and Eric M. Zolt. Connected Contracts. 47 UCLA L. Rev. 887-948 (2000).
8.Hu, Henry T.C. Faith and Magic: Investor Beliefs and Government Neutrality. 78 Tex. L. Rev. 777-884 (2000).
9.Moll, Douglas K. Shareholder Oppression in Close Corporations: The Unanswered Question of Perspective. 53 Vand. L. Rev. 749-827 (2000).
10.Schizer, David M. Executives and Hedging: The Fragile Legal Foundation of Incentive Compatibility. 100 Colum. L. Rev. 440-504 (2000).
11.Smith, Thomas A. The Efficient Norm for Corporate Law: A Neotraditional Interpretation of Fiduciary Duty. 98 Mich. L. Rev. 214-268 (1999).
12.Thomas, Randall S. and Kenneth J. Martin. The Determinants of Shareholder Voting on Stock Option Plans. 35 Wake Forest L. Rev. 31-81 (2000).
13.Thompson, Robert B. Preemption and Federalism in Corporate Governance: Protecting Shareholder Rights to Vote, Sell, and Sue. 62 Law & Contemp. Probs. 215-242 (1999).